Seven Days in May

Dilandu wrote:

TFLYTSNBN wrote:As usual, Dilandu is highly opinionated but only partially informed.

As usual, I'm better informed that you.

Not hardly.

I've actually done the calculations for missile silo kill probabilities. You are merely presuming or regurgitating what you find on the internet.

The movies FAIL SAFE and DOCTOR STRANGELOVE dramatized anxieties about the command and control over the weapons. The system had extremely stringent safeguards. The current alert level is so low that taking out America's bombers would be easy. The Minuteman missile silos are also very vulnerable. Only the missiles on submarines are survivable.

TFLYTSNBN wrote:

Not hardly.

I've actually done the calculations for missile silo kill probabilities. You are merely presuming or regurgitating what you find on the internet.

I'm talking about what was peoples really thinking in late 1940s-1950s, and how it affected their actions & assumptions. You, as usual, are trying to put some useless facts, most of which have no relation to the subject.

Dilandu wrote:

TFLYTSNBN wrote:

Not hardly.

I've actually done the calculations for missile silo kill probabilities. You are merely presuming or regurgitating what you find on the internet.

I'm talking about what was peoples really thinking in late 1940s-1950s, and how it affected their actions & assumptions. You, as usual, are trying to put some useless facts, most of which have no relation to the subject.

The survivability of American and Soviet nuclear deterrent forces back in the 1950s and 1960s is far from useless facts in regards to this subject. The Soviet Union's nuclear forces were so limited and vulnerable that Krushdev had his bombers fly circles around Moscow during the May Day parades to exaggerate their numbers. Russia's nuclear missiles were also extremely vulnerable back then. Even the missiles deployed to Cuba were vulnerable. It was this vulnerability that motivated concern that some American general might decide to launch a first strike, hence the various books and movies.

TFLYTSNBN wrote:
The survivability of American and Soviet nuclear deterrent forces back in the 1950s and 1960s is far from useless facts in regards to this subject. The Soviet Union's nuclear forces were so limited and vulnerable that Krushdev had his bombers fly circles around Moscow during the May Day parades to exaggerate their numbers. Russia's nuclear missiles were also extremely vulnerable back then. Even the missiles deployed to Cuba were vulnerable. It was this vulnerability that motivated concern that some American general might decide to launch a first strike, hence the various books and movies.

What you - as usual - completely fail to understand, is that peoples of 1950s do not have such post-knowledge. For 1950s Americans those circling jet bombers were perfectly real; there were such wide assumptions as "bomber gap", then "missile gap". And that affected psychology of both sides.

We have post-knowledge. Peoples of 1950s do not have such. Try to understood that, it is not so difficult even for you.

Dilandu wrote:

TFLYTSNBN wrote:
The survivability of American and Soviet nuclear deterrent forces back in the 1950s and 1960s is far from useless facts in regards to this subject. The Soviet Union's nuclear forces were so limited and vulnerable that Krushdev had his bombers fly circles around Moscow during the May Day parades to exaggerate their numbers. Russia's nuclear missiles were also extremely vulnerable back then. Even the missiles deployed to Cuba were vulnerable. It was this vulnerability that motivated concern that some American general might decide to launch a first strike, hence the various books and movies.

What you - as usual - completely fail to understand, is that peoples of 1950s do not have such post-knowledge. For 1950s Americans those circling jet bombers were perfectly real; there were such wide assumptions as "bomber gap", then "missile gap". And that affected psychology of both sides.

We have post-knowledge. Peoples of 1950s do not have such. Try to understood that, it is not so difficult even for you.

I was raised in Montana. Our neighbors built a bomb shelter in their back yard. At school we had a bomb shelter in the basement and our teachers staged drills for getting us kids into the shelter as quick as possible. Dilandu is right. The fear was that real. Nobody could explain why anyone would bomb Manhattan, Montana. But maybe Butte or Great Falls could be targets.

All of this was pretty vague. But at least some people in ways that were probably less than rational.

Don

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I lived through those days, and still wonder just how the world dodged that bullet. My only explanation is that those who could have unleashed WW3 on either side, looked at how it would affect them and their families, and backed off.
It must have been tempting for the US in the very early days, when the Soviet Union was much weaker and the precedent of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was fresh to think, "Lets go in early and get it over with", then later when the Soviets had a sort of parity and less scruples for them to think "We could still rule a lessened humanity".
There has been a number of end of world scenario books written, from Fail Safe to The day After, or On the Beach, and more.
Can't remember the title or author, but I did like the premise of one that had the northern hemisphere wiped out, and a coalition of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa being the new world powers, slowing poking into the northern hemisphere for salvage as the radioactivity died down.

Daryl wrote:I lived through those days, and still wonder just how the world dodged that bullet. My only explanation is that those who could have unleashed WW3 on either side, looked at how it would affect them and their families, and backed off.

You may wish to check out "The Man Who Saved The World".
If not for the decision of Lt. Col Stanislav Petrov, who was going against procedure, Russia would have launched a pre-emptive nuclear strike on 26th September, 1983 in response to a technical error that indicated America had launched between two to five nuclear missiles.
Stanislav deduced that it had to be an error since if America was launching an attack, it would have gone for an Alpha Strike of dozens (if not hundreds) of missiles. For his actions, he was neither punished nor rewarded since he had made the right call, but in doing so, he had set up his superiors for potential public embarrassment regarding the bug-ridden nature of the satellite warning system.

The close call did cause Russia to adjust its stance somewhat (knowing that you could have been wiped out because of a technical error is somewhat concerning), but Russia didn't really back down until the march of technology left them economically unable to remain within apparent shouting distance of the West.
These days, fairly accurate readings of the Russian Economy (as in, not filtered through the Kremlin) indicates that despite its sheer size, Russia has a smaller economy than the UK.

Daryl wrote:I lived through those days, and still wonder just how the world dodged that bullet. My only explanation is that those who could have unleashed WW3 on either side, looked at how it would affect them and their families, and backed off.

We're getting to be old duffers aren't we? I think that the answer to your question is that both sides were ultimately sane...

Don

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Dilandu wrote:

TFLYTSNBN wrote:
The survivability of American and Soviet nuclear deterrent forces back in the 1950s and 1960s is far from useless facts in regards to this subject. The Soviet Union's nuclear forces were so limited and vulnerable that Krushdev had his bombers fly circles around Moscow during the May Day parades to exaggerate their numbers. Russia's nuclear missiles were also extremely vulnerable back then. Even the missiles deployed to Cuba were vulnerable. It was this vulnerability that motivated concern that some American general might decide to launch a first strike, hence the various books and movies.

What you - as usual - completely fail to understand, is that peoples of 1950s do not have such post-knowledge. For 1950s Americans those circling jet bombers were perfectly real; there were such wide assumptions as "bomber gap", then "missile gap". And that affected psychology of both sides.

We have post-knowledge. Peoples of 1950s do not have such. Try to understood that, it is not so difficult even for you.

Actually, the US military under the Eisenhower administration understood that the bomber gap was an illusion. Ditto for the missile gap. Our satellites and spy planes could photograph them to count them. The performance of the B-29 copies was insuffecint for intercontinental strikes and he knew it. The early ICBMs seemed scary except that the launch complexes were extremely vulnerable. Kennedy​ was both ignorant and engaging in political grandstanding. Kennedy calmed down after he had the information.

The scariest aspect of the 1950s and 1960s was that the USSR was extremely vulnerable to a first strike and American leaders knew it. Fortunately; American leaders understood that "acceptable casualties" of only a few million Americans was to high a price to pay to destroy the Soviet Union.

The 1980s were a scarier time because the USSR had a far more capable nuclear arsenal. Russia could destroy about 95% of the Minuteman missiles with only its SS-18s. America's submarine missiles were far more survivable but low yield and inaccurate. American ICBMs were more accurate than Russian missiles but had fewer, lower yield warheads making a counterforce strike ineffective.

The scariest time was when the USSR disintegrated. Russia lost the SS-18s in Ukraine. Rather than launch them, they abandoned them. It helped that they understood that Clinton was to busy getting blow jobs in the oval office to exploit their vulnerability.


I reject most of the popular, apocolhptic fiction. None of the authors understand the concepts of half life and decay rate.

TFLYTSNBN wrote:

Actually, the US military under the Eisenhower administration understood that the bomber gap was an illusion. Ditto for the missile gap. Our satellites and spy planes could photograph them to count them. The performance of the B-29 copies was insuffecint for intercontinental strikes and he knew it. The early ICBMs seemed scary except that the launch complexes were extremely vulnerable. Kennedy​ was both ignorant and engaging in political grandstanding. Kennedy calmed down after he had the information.

The scariest aspect of the 1950s and 1960s was that the USSR was extremely vulnerable to a first strike and American leaders knew it. Fortunately; American leaders understood that "acceptable casualties" of only a few million Americans was to high a price to pay to destroy the Soviet Union.

The 1980s were a scarier time because the USSR had a far more capable nuclear arsenal. Russia could destroy about 95% of the Minuteman missiles with only its SS-18s. America's submarine missiles were far more survivable but low yield and inaccurate. American ICBMs were more accurate than Russian missiles but had fewer, lower yield warheads making a counterforce strike ineffective.

The scariest time was when the USSR disintegrated. Russia lost the SS-18s in Ukraine. Rather than launch them, they abandoned them. It helped that they understood that Clinton was to busy getting blow jobs in the oval office to exploit their vulnerability.


I reject most of the popular, apocolhptic fiction. None of the authors understand the concepts of half life and decay rate.

Actually not spy satellites. Sputnik was not launched until '57 or '58. It would be a while before the tech was mature enough for spy work...well after the Eisenhower years. But we did have the U2. Then one was finally shot down after the Russians had the frustration of not being able to get at them due to how high they were flying. I remember my 8th grade teacher staging a mock raffle after that with the ditty..."You too can fly a U2, enjoying the thrill of touring the beautiful Russian country in the springtime..."

Don

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