Dilandu wrote:Had the war continued into 1815 or later, even fewer of them would have gotten to sea.
Hm, but would Royal Navy be able to mantain the close blockade? After all, in 1815 the US navy would have his first ship-of-the-line in comission, and probably the construction of "Demologos" would be finished (and she was a pretty good reason not to mantain the blockade close to shore, after all!).
The RN knew about the USN plans, and the chances of the US liners accomplishing much in 1815-16 wasn't all that great. They were very powerful ships, but they also suffered from low freeboard (their lower gunports were all but useless in a seaway), and the biggest of them were being built on the Great Lakes, where they would have been . . . less than useful. The Brits had scads of experience with blockading French and Spanish seaports (each of which contained several times as many liners as the entire US building program), and with Canada and Bermuda they had bases plenty close enough to keep an eye on the ports where the US liners might be found. Besides, the US ships were being built in ports scattered along the Eastern seaboard; each of them could have been sat upon by a single squadron of British liners without too much trouble. As for the Brits' ability to keep an eye on American ports, look what happened when Decatur tried to take President to sea late in the war.
As for Demologos, I realize you're a technophile , but the odds of her being completed and being sufficiently decisive to lift the blockade of New York (as opposed to materially aiding in New York's defense) was . . . slim, let us say.
Nope, if the war had continued past 1815, the British experience in exerting sea control would have put extremely heavy pressure on the US, and it would have taken years for the USN to build up a battle fleet capable of meeting the RN at sea or breaking a systematic blockade of the East Coast. Exactly what all the ramifications of a long war might have been is impossible to say, of course, and it's a fascinating what-if question, but ultimately it was unlikely the war would have ended any way except the way it did, absent Napoleon's successful return to power.
The key point was that Britain accepted that it wasn't going to defeat the US in North America, and that acceptance stemmed in no small part from the Duke of Wellington's declining to accept the North American command and pointing out that the US really offered no single, clear target which would force the Americans to give in. After all, England had already taken and burned the US capital and the stupid Yankees had declined to surrender.