Convoy escorts - SPOILER for SNIPPET 8 of HFQ

[quote="lyonheart"]Hi Dilandu,

Please.

You know darn well it didn't sortie against the RN again.

Operations in the Baltic, specifically Operation Albion [guess what that means?] to take the Estonian islands, yes.

/quote]

Actually, Lyon, he's right. Scheer sortied again twice in 1916 --- August and October, I think --- but there was no contact between the main fleets. That was partly because in the August sortie, at least, the HSF had zeppelin recon that actually worked.

Scheer had no intention whatsoever of trying conclusions with the main British fleet again; that much is true. And for the August operation (I think the plan was to bombard another British town in hopes --- again --- of provoking an action with a subunit of the GF) he had only 2 BCs in operating condition so he fleshed out the attack force with BBs, which could have been interesting given the BBs' lower speeds. IIRC, one of the BBs was Bayern, which gave the possibility of its being the Brits' turn to run into 15" fire, too.

Nonetheless, your basic point is accurate: the HSF never again sortied to meet the GF head-on. On the other hand, the HSF never sortied to meet the GF head-on. Nothing could have been farther from German intentions!

The psychological trauma of seeing an entire horizon ablaze with muzzle flashes stuck with every member of the Imperial German Navy who saw it, and no one who had seen it ever wanted to see it again. Still, I think the Germans would have continued to attempt attritional operations except for 3 factors. (Well, there were undoubtedly more than 3, but these are the ones that stand out to me.)

(1) The Brits always seemed to be at sea, in strength, waiting for them. They never realized that was because Room 40 was reading their signal traffic, but they were certainly aware that it was happening.

(2) They'd realized that no conceivable loss rate had any realistic chance of being in their favor, especially after the USN came into the war and sent a battle squadron to join the GF.

(3) Probably most important of all, they'd made the decision to invest their supreme naval effort in the U-boats. That both relegated the HSF to "fleet in being" status with a primary measure of tying down the scores of escorts the GF required to prevent them from being used for ASW work and simultaneously siphoned off the best, most aggressive officers and ratings for the U-boats. When Scheer and Hipper hatched their plan for a final sortie in October 1918, the personnel who might have carried it through had largely been dispersed to the U-boat arm and too many of those who were left remembered the nightmare of Jutland and were well aware that the GF was much stronger than it had been then, both absolutely and proportionately.

As Albert Camus once said, any rational army would run away when confronted by a battle. By October 1918, with the war well and truly lost, the enlisted men of the Imperial German Navy had become very rational, indeed.

OK, my first post so be gentle please. For those of you interested in an anglophile look at the rise of the dreadnaughts and through to Juland, may I suggest "Castles of Steel" and" Dreadnaught" by Richard Massie to get a starting place. Not too technical but a good foundation you can build upon.

JP

Thanks RFC and other Forum members, these discussions are better than several collage courses.

Additionally, "Six Frigate" by Ian Toll is as good start on the US frigates as well.

Hi Thrandir,

I'm sorry it took so long to respond, my apologies.

"Always with the negative waves, Moriarty" - "Kelly's Heroes" 1971.

Make it a root beer.

What brands of root beer do they have in Oz?

In England the similarity of a certain toothpaste was enough to put most Brits right off ever trying root beer, even at McDonald's etc.

We used a certain very mild flavored cream soda and Hire's extract to make a reasonable facsimile of Hire's, though our family always preferred the A&W Drive-in's in the '60's; I remember their nickle bags of Frito's with a cup of chili poured over it for 15 cents, but those are bygone days...

Seriously, I've always liked Australia particularly its war record in WWII, and like England proud to have them as allies, as I told a 7th Armored Division "Desert Rats" SP artillery crew in Iraq, NTM being amused by the tales my cousin told [her husband was in the FBI] of their time in Australia as well as other friends.

When I was in DC in 2005, the embassy staff were very kind, letting me study some of their remaining books on the war including the industrial [casting the sentinel tank in ~November 1941 etc] after they'd donated most to the Congressional library [but some weren't yet processed apparently when I requested them].

When I was in England during the '76 Olympics, I had a few Brits tell me they cheered everyone but the Americans, because they thought we were so stuck up, guess we may have learned it from somebody.

Again as I've stated on another thread I'm quite proud of my English ancestry, NTM the Scotch, and all the heroes in between like Winston Spencer Churchill, etc.

Regarding the hapless RN captains expected to win against the American as opposed to the French 44's, it might be argued such a comeuppance was bound to happen sooner or later, like the SLN.

Neither RFC or I had or have ever stated that we thought Britain had lost the war when she signed the Treaty of Ghent.

If you haven't, read CS Forrester's "A Fighting Age of Sail" [1956], to get a Brit view that's more objective or at least favorable to the American position, than most Brit accounts, especially up to that time.

If you haven't or can't, read anything by CS Forrester; including "Payment Deferred" and "Daughter of the Hawk" etc, he was an amazing story teller; supposedly he wrote screenplays for Hollywood 6 month's of the year then wrote what he wanted the other six, sometimes doing a bit of travel for 'research'.

About 20 years ago, I was amazed to find a rather large collection of all his books in the very small town library of Guernsey, Wyoming 30 years after he died, to give an example of his popularity in the States.

He points out it got so bad with the RN officers claiming there were so many Brits aboard the American Frigates who knew how to sail and shoot etc, while the RN frigates were too full of untrained landsmen and Americans etc, that Teddy Roosevelt stated in his history, if the RN officers were to be believed, that they lost because all the Americans aboard the RN ships [it wasn't just frigates the RN lost] refused to shoot at their flag, while all the Brits aboard the American ships would.

On the other hand, since almost all the captains or commanders were exonerated in their courts martial, they all must have had patrons or influence.

Again this isn't to say Madison etc and the western war hawks etc weren't loons, they were.

Personally I think the Democratic-Republicans deserved to lose the war of 1812, because they kept trying to lose, until more practical men like Monroe and the late war crop of US Army officers managed to hold those British regulars off until sanity finally hit both sides simultaneously.

Regarding Wellington, his Spanish and Portuguese campaigns were remarkable, the advance into France is generally ignored though it shouldn't be; but he really came into his own only after Waterloo, where credit should also go to Blucher; who when invited to London afterwards to celebrate, is reputed to have been amazed by its thousand square mile expanse even then and stated "what a city to sack!"

Again this is too long, but I wanted to assure you my true feelings for Great Britain are rather warm and friendly.

L

Thrandir wrote:Geez Lyonheart what's with the aggression?
Come to Oz and I'll buy you a beer

Admittedly I did get carried away a bit but what I stated about the Ghent Conference is historically correct - Britain did not see she had lost.

Unlike some I freely admit the faults of British pride - but it seems when a Briton points something out we are always labelled arrogant (aggressively assertive/presumptuous) - not that we might have a point or could even be right.
Generally Britons are being extremely proud (one of the definitions of arrogant) of our heritage but it seems Britons are not allowed to be proud of our heritage - everyone else is but we aren't; sorry but that does not stack up in any argument.
Before anyone says anything I am being the latter not the former.

Thanks RFC and I totally agree with your summation of British attitudes and thoughts of the time. The trouble with the British Government at the time was they didn't want to listen to Wellington - while he had friends in the Government he also had his detractors who were always quick to point out his mistakes in his campaigns - they glossed over the fact that he more often than not came out on top.
Thirsk reminds very much of Wellington in that he has some very powerful opponents in Government and some very powerful supporters as well.

From some of the logs and other historical records I have read from RN officers who fought the big 44's they all said the same thing - purposely built large frigates were the way to go. They argued long and hard for the RN to adopt the concept - after-all they had enough evidence to show that a purpose built heavy frigate was going to out-muscle and if handled correctly out manoeuvre a smaller 5th and 6th rate. The RN didn't think much of the French 44's because IMHO the French rarely used them as they could have been used.

The RN had a huge shock when they initially encountered the big American 44's and lost or if able to run away. At the time ALL RN commanders were expected to win against any enemy irrespective of the odds.
The RN had a tradition of winning, not all the time but when they really had their backs to the wall the right person stepped up to give them victory.
When they didn't it was not good for morale and the commander concerned had better have good patronage back in Britain if he wasn't to be thrown to the wolves for losing.

runsforcelery wrote:
It's an American idiom. "I don't have a dog in the fight" means that I'm, neutral in whatever's under discussion. In this case, it means that since I'm neither Russian nor Japanese, I'm not invested in demonstrating that "my" side (whichever it might be) was right/better/smarter/etc. Now, if the USN had been a belligerent, things would be different, of course!:lol:

Ah, i understand. Thanks for explanation.

Well, i'm patriotic, but rationally patriotic.

The loss of two of their own battleships to mines screwed up their calculations,

There was also a situation, when the Vladivostok's Cruisers Squadron sunk a steamer with the whole supply of japan heavy siege howitzers... So, actually the IJN screwed twice at least.

the Russians would have to fight their way through the IJN (which would have torpedo boats while the Russians didn't)

Actually. the russian navy at Tsusima have a nine torpedo boats. Not too many, i must admit, but there were a reasonable doubts about the possibility of torpedo boats attack in open sea.

in ships with badly fouled bottoms and machinery that was likely to need servicing badly . . . and that didn't even count the fact that they knew the Russians would have to sail with heavy deckloads of coal. They had a very, very good notion of what that was going to mean in material terms.

Hm. in that i must agree - that could be predicted actually.

I'll give you that Russian gunnery was very good --- indeed, much better than most non-Russian sources allow --- but it wasn't that much better than other navies.

Well, in Yellow Sea, the "Mikasa" was hit 20 times during the early phase of battle, and no russian ship during that phase - were the russian fleet was controlled - have sustained so much damage.

My sources (admittedly, none of which are Russian) would seriously dispute the fact that Russian gunnery was better than the RN and the French.

Well, during the WW1 - i admit, it was later - the russian engagements with "Goeben" demonstrated that. As i recall, in november 1916, the "Imperatritsa Ekaterina" ("Imperatritsa Maria"-class) engaged "Goeben" at the 20000 meters into the sun, and the third salvo hit less the 50 meters out of the target, damaged the enemy with fragments. And later there was another similar incident with "Breslau" ,that was engaged on the more than 22000 meters

I'm not at all sure that that would have been true in 1905 when no one (including the Russians)expected true long-range gunnery engagements.

Actually, Makarov expected that - it was one of the reasons, why the First Pacific Squadron was so good in gunnery. It wasn't the wholke russian navy, i must admit, only the ships that was under Makarov control.

The Russians were in trouble even before Witgeft was killed, although I will certainly agree that thw hit on his flagship's bridge was the decisive moment of the engagement. Russian formation discipline was poor, compared to that of the IJN.

Well, that was the problem, i must admit.

My sources suggest that both Russia and Japan were unhappy with their respective gunnery results during the Russo-Japanese War and both took steps to address the shortcoming post-1905.

Yes, that's right. The russian navy was satisfied with the penetration power of their shells... but was completely dissatisfied with their fuses, that simply doesn't work in most times.

As I've explained above, the Japanese knew that the fight between their entire navy and the Port Arthur squadron would be long over (Ione way or the other) before the Baltic Fleet ever put in an appearance.

Yes, but the point is, that the IJN started the war wothout any industrial or naval superiority even in local therms. With all respect, the IJN superiority wasn't so overwhelming to guarantee for the Japan victory over Pacific Navy without expecting heavy losses on the japanese side. And if the japanese lost enpugh ships dealing with First Pacific Squadron - what they are supposed to do when the larger Baltic Fleet appeared? With all respect, i didn't think that the Togo would be able to repeat his Tsusima sucsess with only two or three battleships and three or four armoured cruisers in action.

My point, that the japanese started the war without any reservations (as they usually do ). They threw all they got in battle in expectation of complete sucsess (and as you pointed prevoiusly - actually screw it). But they were still able to commence the victory against much larger naval and industrial power.

Now, as to the military potential of the two sides post-Tsushima and post-Mukden, neither one of them was in good shape to continue the war. Russia was on the verge of Revolution; Japan was on the verge of collapse. Russia had no Navy left; the Japanese Army was at full stretch and the Russians were shipping in supplies. Both sides later resented Teddy Roosevelt's role in brokering the peace treaty at Portsmouth, but --- at the time --- both sides were glad to accept it before something even worse happened to them!

Well, actually there was a russian fleet that still could be used... the Black Sea Fleet (that was one of the reason why the Japan were ready to gave many of their claims to end the war). They have the "Knyaz Potemkin-Tavricheskyy", the "Rostislav", the "Dvenadtsat Apostolov" and "Tri Svyatitela" in comission, and even without them the power in older ships to keep the Ottoman navy in bay. But generally, it's true, that both sides were unable to fight any longer.

The problem was, that the russian internal problems wasn't something that Japan could claim as their actions. At least, not more than triggering it.

Dilandu wrote:

runsforcelery wrote:
It's an American idiom. "I don't have a dog in the fight" means that I'm, neutral in whatever's under discussion. In this case, it means that since I'm neither Russian nor Japanese, I'm not invested in demonstrating that "my" side (whichever it might be) was right/better/smarter/etc. Now, if the USN had been a belligerent, things would be different, of course!:lol:

Dilandu wrote:Ah, i understand. Thanks for explanation.

Well, i'm patriotic, but rationally patriotic.

runsforcelery wrote:The loss of two of their own battleships to mines screwed up their calculations,

Dilandu wrote:There was also a situation, when the Vladivostok's Cruisers Squadron sunk a steamer with the whole supply of japan heavy siege howitzers... So, actually the IJN screwed twice at least.

True, but finding replacement siege guns was a little easier than getting battleships back up off the bottom!

runsforcelery wrote:the Russians would have to fight their way through the IJN (which would have torpedo boats while the Russians didn't)

Dilandu wrote:Actually. the russian navy at Tsusima have a nine torpedo boats. Not too many, i must admit, but there were a reasonable doubts about the possibility of torpedo boats attack in open sea.

That's true; I'd forgotten them. But would they properly have been considered torpedo boats or torpedo boat destroyers? I don't have a source handy to check at the moment.

runsforcelery wrote: in ships with badly fouled bottoms and machinery that was likely to need servicing badly . . . and that didn't even count the fact that they knew the Russians would have to sail with heavy deckloads of coal. They had a very, very good notion of what that was going to mean in material terms.

Dilandu wrote:Hm. in that i must agree - that could be predicted actually.

runsforcelery wrote:I'll give you that Russian gunnery was very good --- indeed, much better than most non-Russian sources allow --- but it wasn't that much better than other navies.

Dilandu wrote:Well, in Yellow Sea, the "Mikasa" was hit 20 times during the early phase of battle, and no russian ship during that phase - were the russian fleet was controlled - have sustained so much damage.

runsforcelery wrote: My sources (admittedly, none of which are Russian) would seriously dispute the fact that Russian gunnery was better than the RN and the French.

Dilandu wrote:Well, during the WW1 - i admit, it was later - the russian engagements with "Goeben" demonstrated that. As i recall, in november 1916, the "Imperatritsa Ekaterina" ("Imperatritsa Maria"-class) engaged "Goeben" at the 20000 meters into the sun, and the third salvo hit less the 50 meters out of the target, damaged the enemy with fragments. And later there was another similar incident with "Breslau" ,that was engaged on the more than 22000 meters

IIRC, Slava's gunnery was very good in the Battle of Riga and the Moon Sound action, as well.

runsforcelery wrote:I'm not at all sure that that would have been true in 1905 when no one (including the Russians)expected true long-range gunnery engagements.

Dilandu wrote:Actually, Makarov expected that - it was one of the reasons, why the First Pacific Squadron was so good in gunnery. It wasn't the wholke russian navy, i must admit, only the ships that was under Makarov control.

Um. That fits with most of what I've read of him. On the other hand, I've sometimes wondered if his reputation hasn't grown in the telling, as we'd say over here, because of his stature as the one Russian admiral who showed up really well in the entire war. We Americans have a tendency to venerate officers who don't necessarily deserve it (fully, at least) on the merits because they had good press or were a bright spot in an otherwise gloomy war situation. William Bainbridge would be one example. "Hard Luck Bill" managed to lose the schooner Retaliation in the quasi war with France (by sailing right up to two French frigates he thought were British without checking assumptions first). Then he lost USS Philadelphia by running her onto a shoal in Tripoli Harbor (and surrendering her after a five hour "bombardment" in which, IIRC, he hadn't lost a man). He wasn't exactly stellar in several other commands, either, and he actively connived at getting Stephen Decatur killed in a duel with a fellow USN officer because of professional jealousy and a grudge he carried over a scathing report from a board Decatur had chaired years before. (I should mention, I suppose, that one reason he hated Decatur was that after he surrendered Philadelphia --- and the tide floated her back off the shoal --- Decatur led the boarding action which destroyer her right under the guns of the enemy. In the duel in question, however, he masqueraded as Decatur's friend, acted as his second, and then worked actively to make sure either Decatur or his opponent got killed, which would have finished --- and did effectively finish --- the career of whoever survived, as well.) Despite that, the USN's named several ships for him, including the first nuclear-powered cruiser in US service. Another example, of a slightly different sort, would be Bill Halsey, who achieved iconic status as a "fighting admiral" during the darker periods of the war in the Pacific but made several questionable decisions (including the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands and his movements during the Battle of Leyte Gulf) which tend to be overlooked by those who worship at his shrine.

I've always wondered if there might not be a little of that in Makarov's case, since I've actually read relatively little about him in English-language sources.

runsforcelery wrote: My sources suggest that both Russia and Japan were unhappy with their respective gunnery results during the Russo-Japanese War and both took steps to address the shortcoming post-1905.

Dilandu wrote:Yes, that's right. The russian navy was satisfied with the penetration power of their shells... but was completely dissatisfied with their fuses, that simply doesn't work in most times.

They weren't the only ones having that particular problem at the time! Good AP fuzes were something of a dark art for everyone.

runsforcelery wrote:As I've explained above, the Japanese knew that the fight between their entire navy and the Port Arthur squadron would be long over (Ione way or the other) before the Baltic Fleet ever put in an appearance.

Dilandu wrote:Yes, but the point is, that the IJN started the war wothout any industrial or naval superiority even in local therms. With all respect, the IJN superiority wasn't so overwhelming to guarantee for the Japan victory over Pacific Navy without expecting heavy losses on the japanese side. And if the japanese lost enpugh ships dealing with First Pacific Squadron - what they are supposed to do when the larger Baltic Fleet appeared? With all respect, i didn't think that the Togo would be able to repeat his Tsusima sucsess with only two or three battleships and three or four armoured cruisers in action.

My point, that the japanese started the war without any reservations (as they usually do ). They threw all they got in battle in expectation of complete sucsess (and as you pointed prevoiusly - actually screw it). But they were still able to commence the victory against much larger naval and industrial power.

I understand your point, but I also think you're misestimating the actual balance between Japan and Russia at the time. Japan was looking at the enormous advantages of location it possessed, and its strategy --- starting with the surprise attack on Port Arthur --- was designed to grain and keep the upper hand both strategically and psychologically over the Russians. They also had a pretty good idea of the lethargy of the Russian leadership in Port Arthur and planned to capitalize on it. and while it's true that the Russians suffered some bad luck during the war, but so did the IJN, yet the IJN resoundingly defeated the Russian Navy in the end. There's another English language idiom --- the proof is in the pudding --- which means that the only way to judge the real effectiveness of an effort is by the way it works out in the end. By that metric, the Japanese were entirely correct in their estimate of their capabilities vis-à-vis those of Russia and her navy.

runsforcelery wrote:Now, as to the military potential of the two sides post-Tsushima and post-Mukden, neither one of them was in good shape to continue the war. Russia was on the verge of Revolution; Japan was on the verge of collapse. Russia had no Navy left; the Japanese Army was at full stretch and the Russians were shipping in supplies. Both sides later resented Teddy Roosevelt's role in brokering the peace treaty at Portsmouth, but --- at the time --- both sides were glad to accept it before something even worse happened to them!

Dilandu wrote:Well, actually there was a russian fleet that still could be used... the Black Sea Fleet (that was one of the reason why the Japan were ready to gave many of their claims to end the war). They have the "Knyaz Potemkin-Tavricheskyy", the "Rostislav", the "Dvenadtsat Apostolov" and "Tri Svyatitela" in comission, and even without them the power in older ships to keep the Ottoman navy in bay. But generally, it's true, that both sides were unable to fight any longer.

The problem was, that the russian internal problems wasn't something that Japan could claim as their actions. At least, not more than triggering it.

I'm aware of the Black Sea Fleet, but how was Russia going to get it out of the Black Sea and send it off to Asian waters? And even if they[d managed it, what about the additional ships Japan could have added to her fleet while it was getting itself together to make the voyage? In fact, several of the surrendered Russian prizes which were eventually taken into Japanese service could probably could have been refitted and put into Japanese service by the time a third Russian wave could have gotten to the Pacific.

You're right that they couldn't have counted on the wave of unrest which swept through Russia, and I think it's entirely fair to say that they seriously underestimated the degree of economic strain their war effort would impose on their own government and economy. And it's definitely true that they hideously underestimated how long the capture of Port Arthur would take and how much it would cost them in casualties, as well as time. On the other hand, war is always a high-risk enterprise, and it's more common than not for one or both sides to have seriously misestimated the risks involved. The imperial Russian government certainly underestimated Japan disastrously! And if the Japanese had no way to know the unrest was coming, the Russian government should have . . . and did, in many ways. Does the phrase "What this country needs is a short, victorious war to stem the tide of revolution" sound familiar? I think some hack SF writer stole it for the title of a novel one time . . . .

I will agree with you about the pre-WW II Japanese proclivity for charging into exceptionally high-risk gambles, however. In 1904, they happen to have gauged the odds correctly, judged by the outcome. In 1941, they tried to repeat the same roll of the dice on a far larger scale and crapped out disastrously. Indeed, their success in 1904-05 was key to their disaster in 1941-45. They knew there was no way they could ultimately out build Russia or the US, although in 1904-05 they could at least hope to buy additional vessels overseas from their good friends the UK to help redress the balance somewhat. In 1941,the US was in the process of actively building a naval strength they knew they couldn't defeat, especially since it wasn't going to be divided between the Pacific, Baltic, and Black Sea when the US needed it. The 1941 decision was made on the calculation that the new US programs established an ever-narrowing window which would, within one or two years at the outside, make it impossible --- as opposed to highly unlikely (by any rational measure ) --- that the IJN could defeat the USN. So they made what amounted to a do-or-die decision, guided (at least in part) by their experience against Russia and a serious misreading of the character of the US electorate, and embraced a strategy in which war weariness was supposed to preclude the Americans from paying the price demanded for victory. Among other things, they read American pacifism and the hoops through which FDR had to jump just to get Lend-Lease through an isolationist Congress as an indication that the US would have no stomach for the task, and their experience in 1904-05 played a major role in making that particular blunder in evaluating their enemy. The US in 1941 was most emphatically not Russia in 1904 in terms of domestic cohesion, however, and FDR and the US military never had to fight the Japanese while worrying that the country might go up in revolution behind them! Not only that, but virtually every sector of the US public "had a dog in the fight" in this instance, whereas the Russian war effort against Japan never really had that sort of fervent support from the bulk of the population, if only because the bulk of the population was excluded from significant participation in Russian political life and policymaking.

runsforcelery wrote:That's true; I'd forgotten them. But would they properly have been considered torpedo boats or torpedo boat destroyers? I don't have a source handy to check at the moment.

Hm. They were "Byinyi"-class, 450 tonn, 27-knots boats with one 75-mm, five 47-mm guns and three 381-mm torpedo tubes. Actually, they were based on the same "Yarrow" desing, that the japanese "Akatsuki".

Um. That fits with most of what I've read of him. On the other hand, I've sometimes wondered if his reputation hasn't grown in the telling, as we'd say over here, because of his stature as the one Russian admiral who showed up really well in the entire war

Well, there is part of it. After all, his real tactical skills remain unprowed - he was killed early in the war, and wasn't able to demonstrate them. So, maybe he was more a great naval engineer then commander, i must admit.

But the one thing that Makarov has, was the determination to go and fight - that, unfortunately, the many other russian admirals missing.

This is my completely IMHO, of course, but i think that after the disastrous Crimean War, the russian navy was too concentrated on coastal defense, and generally - on the defensive tactics and ocean raiding (forced to admit, it make sence, because the main possible naval opponent was the Royal Navy). The russian naval officers were personally brave, but lacked the initative, and accustomed to the idea that they - the weakest side, so that cannot take too much risk without extremely necessary. They waited until they would have the overwhelming superiority, too worried "what could happened if we would be destroyed".

Generally, the simplest way to won, or at least not too lose the war fo russian navy was to sortie in early part of the war and seek for the deciesive battle. The battleship strenght of the russian and japanese fleet was equal. If the russian navy won, the war was immediately ended and the Japan would be forced to ask for peace on russian conditions. If theyu lose, with enough determination they would inflict so much damage to the japan navy, that the Japan still would be forced to ask for peace, because the Baltic Navy would arrive and exterminate their surviving ships. So... no-lose scenario, and the Royal Navy, or french navy would probably just do that.

But... the russian navy do exactly the opposite; they chose to wait until reinforcements, that could not arrive quickly enough. And that was a terrible mistake.

I understand your point, but I also think you're misestimating the actual balance between Japan and Russia at the time. Japan was looking at the enormous advantages of location it possessed, and its strategy --- starting with the surprise attack on Port Arthur --- was designed to grain and keep the upper hand both strategically and psychologically over the Russians.

Well, i must admit that it's true. Probably the main part that IJN estimated correctly, was that the russian navy would act in assumption that they would be reinforced soon - but actually, they cannot be reinforced soon, and it would be more correct for the russian navy to act as they haven't any reinforcement at all - and so the russian navy would prefer the passive strategy.

I'm aware of the Black Sea Fleet, but how was Russia going to get it out of the Black Sea and send it off to Asian waters?

Actually, it wasn't too hard in this historical period. The Ottomans actually were quite ready for some agreements, because they already were concerned about Italy and the danger from the Balkan slavic (and other) nations. So, at least in theory the Russian Empire still have some naval forces in existence, that may be used.

Does the phrase "What this country needs is a short, victorious war to stem the tide of revolution" sound familiar? I think some hack SF writer stole it for the title of a novel one time . . . .

Who could it be, i wonder?

The US in 1941 was most emphatically not Russia in 1904 in terms of domestic cohesion, however, and FDR and the US military never had to fight the Japanese while worrying that the country might go up in revolution behind them! Not only that, but virtually every sector of the US public "had a dog in the fight" in this instance, whereas the Russian war effort against Japan never really had that sort of fervent support from the bulk of the population, if only because the bulk of the population was excluded from significant participation in Russian political life and policymaking.

And i completely agree with that. Unfortunately, the Russian Empire was far below average level of social, economical and political progress, and the ruling classes simply didn't understand that. The last Tsar... well, he was clearly the worst type of "men on the wrong place in wrong time". He really believed that his rights for the absolute ruling is divine, and he hasn't got real willpower and determination to actually use his power for good. The main part of population was illiterate, and simply cannot understand "why we need to battle for Port-Artur?"

But it look like we deviated from the line. My point is, that Japanese made some assumption - and was partially right - and defeat the overwhelmingly superior Russian Empire.

Why the France can't made some assumptions of her own?

Let's recall the 1898.

The main french naval strategy, as i could reconstruct it, were based on few assumptions:

- The Royal Navy would prefer to act, not to passively stay in defense

- The Royal Navy wouldn't left the metropoly undefended

- The mobilisation rate of british naval reserve is inferior to the french

Which were kept at a sufficiently reliable facts, not just assumptions. For example, before the Fisher's reforms, the Royal Navy really didn't have something like sufficient number of "core crews" for the reserve ships, and the rates of UK naval mobilization in 1890-early 1900 were poor.

The french navy was in 1898 mostly concentrated in Mediterranian. For 1898, they have here:

- Four-to-five modern "Charles Martell" class battleships (the "Massena" arrived lately)

- One "intermediate" battleship "Brennus"

- Three older (by design) "Marceau"-class battleships

The opposite side - the Mediterranian Navy of Great Britain - have in 1898:

- Two modern "Majestic"-class battleships, HMS "Caesar" and HMS "Illustrious"

- Six "Royal Sovereign"-class battleships; HMS "Royal Sovereign", HMS "Hood", HMS "Empress of India", HMS "Ramilles", HMS "Revenge", HMS "Royal Oak"

- Two still comissioned "Admiral"-class battleships

So, theoretically the Royal Navy surpassed the french navy in mediterranian as 10 battleships to 8. But of the ten Mediterranian Fleet battleships, only two were modern, and the two "Admirals" was clearly outdated and unfitted for 1890th naval warfare.

So, actually the french navy in Mediterranian was superior to the british. Due to the french more powerfull artillery (long-barreled guns, reloaded at any train), more powerfull ammunition (the french already have HE with melinite, that would be immensely effective against the old, citadel-armoured "Royal Sovereign"'s), more modern tactic (the Royal Navy still used the old "turn at flagship's command", when the french adopted more simple and effective "do what the flagship done") and some other things - the french were perfectly able to inflict the Mediterranian-type Tsusima against RN.

Of course, the Royal Navy have a lot of battleships in metropoly (and some on Far East). But the problem was, that actually they have only six more "Majestic" and two more "Royal Sovereign" (not counting the second-rates on China Station, because they were too far)of Channel Fleet in comission. And the RN was unable to send the significant part of Channel Fleet without the weakening the defense of metroply. The Briain was actually not greatly loved on the continent; the relations with Germany were bad, and the Russia was the french ally.

So if the french would be able to inflict some serious damage to the RN in Mediterranian, the RN would found itself unable to compensate. At least until the reserve would be recomissioned, that may take more than a half of the year. During that time, the french navy would be able to do anything they want on Mediterranian - probably seize the Malta and Gibraltar - and effectively leave the RN without any base in region.

I will not say that in practice it would have gone so well, but it would require a lower of assumptions than for the Japanese to defeat the Russian Empire!

Dilandu wrote:But it look like we deviated from the line. My point is, that Japanese made some assumption - and was partially right - and defeat the overwhelmingly superior Russian Empire.

Why the France can't made some assumptions of her own?

Let's recall the 1898.

The main french naval strategy, as i could reconstruct it, were based on few assumptions:

- The Royal Navy would prefer to act, not to passively stay in defense

- The Royal Navy wouldn't left the metropoly undefended

- The mobilisation rate of british naval reserve is inferior to the french

Which were kept at a sufficiently reliable facts, not just assumptions. For example, before the Fisher's reforms, the Royal Navy really didn't have something like sufficient number of "core crews" for the reserve ships, and the rates of UK naval mobilization in 1890-early 1900 were poor.

The french navy was in 1898 mostly concentrated in Mediterranian. For 1898, they have here:

- Four-to-five modern "Charles Martell" class battleships (the "Massena" arrived lately)

- One "intermediate" battleship "Brennus"

- Three older (by design) "Marceau"-class battleships

The opposite side - the Mediterranian Navy of Great Britain - have in 1898:

- Two modern "Majestic"-class battleships, HMS "Caesar" and HMS "Illustrious"

- Six "Royal Sovereign"-class battleships; HMS "Royal Sovereign", HMS "Hood", HMS "Empress of India", HMS "Ramilles", HMS "Revenge", HMS "Royal Oak"

- Two still comissioned "Admiral"-class battleships

So, theoretically the Royal Navy surpassed the french navy in mediterranian as 10 battleships to 8. But of the ten Mediterranian Fleet battleships, only two were modern, and the two "Admirals" was clearly outdated and unfitted for 1890th naval warfare.

So, actually the french navy in Mediterranian was superior to the british. Due to the french more powerfull artillery (long-barreled guns, reloaded at any train), more powerfull ammunition (the french already have HE with melinite, that would be immensely effective against the old, citadel-armoured "Royal Sovereign"'s), more modern tactic (the Royal Navy still used the old "turn at flagship's command", when the french adopted more simple and effective "do what the flagship done") and some other things - the french were perfectly able to inflict the Mediterranian-type Tsusima against RN.

Of course, the Royal Navy have a lot of battleships in metropoly (and some on Far East). But the problem was, that actually they have only six more "Majestic" and two more "Royal Sovereign" (not counting the second-rates on China Station, because they were too far)of Channel Fleet in comission. And the RN was unable to send the significant part of Channel Fleet without the weakening the defense of metroply. The Briain was actually not greatly loved on the continent; the relations with Germany were bad, and the Russia was the french ally.

So if the french would be able to inflict some serious damage to the RN in Mediterranian, the RN would found itself unable to compensate. At least until the reserve would be recomissioned, that may take more than a half of the year. During that time, the french navy would be able to do anything they want on Mediterranian - probably even seize the Malta and Gibraltar - and effectively leave the RN without any base in region.

I will not say that in practice it would have gone so well, but it would require a lower of assumptions than for the Japanese to defeat the Russian Empire!

The biggest difference between the Russo-Japanese War and a hypothetical Anglo-French war in 1898 is the difference in what some analysts would call their "geostratic" positions. That is, geography favored the British in any reinforcement/redistribution of forces much more than it favored Russia in the Far East. While it's true that France had the edge in the Med, did they really want to kick off a war against England in which they might enjoy short-term successes but would ultimately find themselves up against not a somewhat ramshackle continental empire with a (by European standards) very limited industrial base (that's Russia; sorry! ) but rather against what was overwhelmingly the greatest industrial power in the world at that time? I'm not entirely certain that the differential between France and England at that time wasn't at least close (proportionately) to the difference between Japan and Russia, though I haven't tried to go and pull out any research data to support that. When you couple that with the fact that in 1898 the Brits had 15 more battleships under construction (counting the last 3 Majestics and reaching a little to bring in the 3 Formidables which had only just been laid down), whereas the French had only 6 (counting Bouvet, the 3 Charlemagnes, Henri IV and Iena. At least the remaining Majestics and Ocean, Goliath and Canopus could almost certainly have been rushed to completion by mid-1899 (don't forget; this is the same nation that rushed Dreadnought through to completion in one year from a standing start) and would have constituted a much greater reinforcement of British naval strength than the French (whose ability to accelerate construction was much lower, anyway) could have looked for in the same time period. Moreover, I think it's highly likely the Brits would have done in 1898 what they'd done repeatedly in earlier wars and risked reducing their strength in home waters to reinforce the Med if that was the critical theatre. When you combine that with how much more rapidly the Brits would be able to redploy from distant stations, compared to the way the Baltic Fleet moved to the Far East (rather in the nature of a snail with severe arthritis, I'm afraid ), the French time window would have been even narrower.

Finally, unlike Japan in the Far East, England had a potential ally, very close to home, with an extremely powerful army: the German Empire. The Second Boer War didn't start until October 1899 and Germany didn't pass the First Naval law until 1898, so the two most vexatious pre-WWI issues between Germany and England really wouldn't have been factors at this time, and there was always that lingering Anglo-Russian animosity to consider as an additional motivator for cooperation and Russophile France. I think it's highly likely that if France had initiated a war in the Med and Foreign Secretary Salisbury had gone to Chancellor Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst and Naval Minister von Tirpitz and suggested an alliance (accompanied by a naval understanding and possibly some postwar overseas territorial adjustments at French expense), Germany might just have been prepared to rattle a few sabers along her eastern frontiers. Russia didn't have anyone it could get to do that in Japan's case.

What I'm saying, in other words, is that in many ways the Russo-Japanese War took place in a vacuum as far as the other Great Powers were concerned. No one else's fundamental interests or territorial integrity were threatened in any way, and it was highly unlikely that Russia could offer any of the other Great Powers sufficient inducement to join up with her. England and France already had just about everything they wanted in China and Indo-China, and it was very unlikely Russia (especially after the battering her prestige had taken) could possibly have reassembled the coalition which compelled Japan to give up Korea after the Sino-Japanese War. That was distinctly not the case in Europe and it's extremely unlikely France (a) could have organized a "bolt from the blue" (i.e., sudden, surprise attack) against the British Empire without the Brits realizing it was coming and taking rather more effective steps than were taken at Port Arthur and Vladivostok (or in St. Petersburg) or (b) have risked a war which could have had major implications for her own territorial integrity if the Brits started cozying up to Imperial Germany. And if England had demonstrated anything over the last 300 years or so (from the time of William and Mary on) it was that she understood how to play the balance of power game and cut pragmatic deals even with people she really, really didn't like (like Austria and Russia during the Napoleonic Wars) when her fundamental security was on the line. So despite all the traditional animosity between the "Frogs" and the "Limeys" and the lunatics of the Jeuene Ecole notwithstanding, the probability of an Anglo-French War in the second half of the 19th century was never really in the cards.

If such a war had begun, there would probably have been an Admiral Pierre Yammomoto or Isoroku Courbet who would have said "«Dans le cas d'une guerre dans la Méditerranée, je peux courir sauvage pendant six mois ... après ça, je dois sans espoir de succès."