This --
Astelon wrote:If sixty percent of the dragons (102) are available (assuming twenty percent at hunting grounds and a further twenty percent assigned to other duties) you can still get all the men out, supplies to feed those men would be limited though. You might be able to do it if only forty percent (68) are available, but you only have 170 pounds per person. This would require loading more weight onto some dragons, and limiting their range. But they don't have to fly very far (300 miles or so) to outrun ground forces that are limited to fifteen miles an hour.
Further I would expect the transport command to keep a supply of accumulators for emergencies, like combat operations or retreating.
Assumes the following:
1. An evacuation plan in the event of Sharonan flanking, by-pass, or breakthrough.
2. The dragon evacuation rally point is not under Sharonan talent directed artillery fire
3. Regardless of #1 & #2, the ability to communicate rapidly to the various elements to be evacuated.
These don't seem to be there.
Further, from a recent 40 year anniversary, the Fall of Saigon is remembered mostly for media photos and film of helicopters leaving the American embassy and arriving on American aircraft carriers to be dumped over the side.
What is not remembered were the Vietnamese Rangers, properly known in Vietnamese as the Biệt Động Quân, who held the air evacuation perimeter and were mostly destroyed by PAVN armored columns in and around Saigon.
Any Arcanian evacuation is going to have a rear guard who will not be getting away from Sharonan Bisons.
In a lot of ways the Arcanian military reminds me
a lot of the following description of South Vietnam's ARVN military forces right down to the corruption, lack of officer professionalism, and the ethnic fragmentation:
The ARVN had some HUGE problems, however, and they prevented it from ever being the cohesive & motivated fighting force that the PAVN was.
Most of these problems started at the top. The RVN military wasn't simply a fighting force, it was a source of political power & a place for patronage. Under Diem, Thieu & the ones in between Generals were appointed for political loyalty, not ability. The same was often true of officers down to colonel level. Even the distribution of units throughout the country was sometimes based on the need to shore up political power in one place or another.
This didn't mean that men of ability didn't rise to the top, but they were unevenly distributed & could not always rely on ability to get ahead. Worse, the gulf between good & bad was VAST. The US military & the PAVN were essentially professional militaries (the PAVN was politicized, but in a different way). Even a poor officer at least had the benefit of proper professional training & would often be replaced for poor performance.
The political dimension in the ARVN worked against it in a number of ways. One was the professionalism of officers. Another was corruption. The RVN was one of the most legendarily corrupt regimes of modern history. There is little doubt that there were officers who sold off equipment on the black market. I'm not sure if there was padding of numbers with 'ghost' soldiers (as in the Cambodian FANK), but it wouldn't surprise me. All of this couldn't help but lower morale.
The issue of morale is very important in understanding the ARVN. The deep divisions in RVN society (Chinese, Vietnamese, Catholic, Khmer, Hmong, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao) limited the effectiveness of conscription. Close ties to regional areas made moving units around difficult. Mistrust of government & deep divisions over the purpose of the war also hindered cohesion. Rates of desertion & refusal to be conscripted were also problems.
The truth about the ARVN is that it was wildly erratic. At its best its units could match it with the best. Unfortunately the unevenness of the organization as a whole meant that performance such as this could not be sustained indefinitely. In the end poor units were going to face good ones. In the end the sight of one unit or another breaking would domino, as it did more than once. I would agree that American observers have been overly harsh on the ARVN, but that does not mean it was not deeply flawed.
In a lot of ways, this battle set up for Return to Hell reminds me greatly of the 1974 Battle of Thuong Duc.
See reference here:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... bn-div.htm
