Alistair wrote:In Pearls of Weber it states:
If Beowulf had wished at any time to become a member star system of the Star Kingdom of Manticore, it could legally have done so. The Solarian League Constitution, like that of the Republic of Haven, enshrines the right of self-determination by its member systems, and the right of any member system to withdraw from the League. No full member system has ever attempted to do so, and the possible consequences of such an attempt might be interesting, but the legal right exists and is recognized by all constitutional scholars.
If Beowulf right to leave is recognised by ALL "constitutional scholars" then do the Mandarins have a leg to stand on in the court of public opinion when Beowulf leaves the SL?
The question here isn't whether or not Beowulf has a legal right as defined by the Constitution to leave the League; it's whether or not the constitutional provision is still operable, despite never having been repealed or formally amended.
To pick a couple of somewhat contentious present day US constitutional debates: the 10th and 2nd Amendments. The 10th Amendment's specific guarantee of the powers of the states has been largely emasculated simply by being ignored by the Federal government, effectively since the end of the Civil War and even more since the 17th amendment established the direct election of senators and eliminated the process which was supposed to make the Senate the guarantor of federalism. The question of whether or not the 2nd Amendment protects an individual or a collective right — that is, whether it refers to individuals’ right to be armed or only to the creation of a “well regulated militia” — has been especially vexatious in the US since 1939 but was largely a nonissue prior to that time. In 1939, the Supreme Court took a collectivist approach when it allowed the Federal government to regulate sawed off shotguns under the interstate commerce clause by arguing that the amendment referred to a militia and not to an individual. The decision was neither as complete nor as sweeping as many anti-gun proponents have asserted, but it stood for about 70 years. More recent Court decisions against the cities of Washington and Chicago have asserted that it represents a guarantee of an individual’s right to be armed and that the guarantee applies not simply to the Federal government but to state and local governments, as well, under the 14th Amednment. These decisions are neither as complete nor as weeping as many pro-gun proponents have asserted, but they have certainly reversed the trend in the collectivist direction.
The SL’s constitution is several times as old as the present US Constitution, and (in many ways) constitutional law is much less well developed in the SL than in the US because the SL’s constitution has been essentially ignored in so many ways during the evolution of the present bureaucratic system. The sheer age of that bureaucratic system --- fact that it's been in existence and effectively unchallenged for so many centuries --- only reinforces that tendency and obscures the theoretically clear limitations on governmental power in general. Thus the right to secede from the League is in fact recognized by “all” constitutional authorities as existing in law but is not universally recognized as existing in fact. This is an important distinction, and one which is, unfortunately, often lost sight of by people who believe in the rules of law.
For example, US history is replete with presidents , congresses, and (especially) agencies which have cheerfully ignored constitutional restrictions until/unless they were brought up short by the courts . . . and in some cases, even after being ruled against by the courts. I’m sure quite a few US citizens will recall FDR’s attempt to pack the Supreme Court when the Court began ruling his anti-Depression programs unconstitutional. Going farther back in time we have Andrew Jackson defying the Marshall Court in Worcester v. Georgia, and present day federal agencies like the IRS are notorious for nonacquiescence — that is, for deliberately ignoring court decisions which go against them and refusing to accept their validity as binding precedent. In the final analysis, the rule of law — the ability of the judiciary to enforce its interpretation of law on the rest of government — depends upon the willingness of the rest of the government to allow itself to be so bound. The US idea is that the balance of powers between the branches will produce not just rivalries but also natural alliances between them, in the sense of each branch safeguarding its own power from encroachment by the others and combining to prevent any one branch from usurping its/their powers. The equation depends upon balance, however, and once the balance begins slipping, it’s almost inevitable that one branch or the other will begin amassing a disproportionate share of power at the cost of the other branches, regardless of anything the letter of the law may say.
Mandarins, anyone?
